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FOREWORD
For the United States, Central Asia is a region of
both growing importance and of growing challenge. Its
proximity to Russia, China, Iran, India, and Pakistan;,
location as the center of the Global War on Terrorism;
and its large energy holdings make it a strategic region
where the United States has important, some might
even say vital, interests. Those interests pertain, first of
all, to geostrategic realities of security, particularly in
the war on terrorism. But they also pertain to energy and
to the effort to support liberalizing and democratizing
reforms.
However, today those interests are challenged by
Russo-Chinese and Iranian opposition to U.S. presence
there, those governments’ and local regimes’ resistance
to reform, and the revival of the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Therefore we need to assess how those challenges are
manifesting themselves and how America best might
adapt to meet them and pursue its interests with greater
success.
Accordingly, the Strategic Studies Institute is
pleased to present this monograph by Professor
Stephen Blank who takes a fresh look at the current
situation in Central Asia and makes substantive policy
recommendations to the U.S. Army, the Defense
Department, and the U.S. Government concerning the
best way to move forward in this critical area of world
politics.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Central Asia is an area whose importance to the
United States is growing. Yet it also is an imperiled
region because it faces numerous constant challenges
stemming from pervasive internal misrule and the
continuing interest of terrorist organizations in
overthrowing local regimes. Its significance is, first,
strategic due to its proximity to the war on terrorism
and major actors like Russia, China, Iran, Pakistan,
and India. Only secondarily is it important by virtue
of its energy. Another key interest of U.S. policy is the
promotion of democratic reforms and of open societies
throughout the region.
Today American interests are under challenge in
three definable areas. First, Russia and China have
launched a coordinated campaign to oust the U.S.
strategic presence from Central Asia. Second, they
and local governments, who have good reason to
fear democratic reforms, have waged an ideological
campaign, accusing the United States of organizing
“color revolutions” to oust those regimes from power.
The purpose here is to preserve the status quo and,
for Moscow and Beijing, to further erode America’s
capability for action in the area. The third challenge
is that posed by a revived Taliban offensive in
Afghanistan. Thus America faces simultaneous and
overlapping military, political, economic (attempts
to close markets, in particular energy markets), and
ideological challenges to its interests.
These challenges succeeded to a point in 2005
because of a lack of policy coordination at home and
due to diminishing policy interest in the region, e.g.,
a neglect of the need to answer ideological attacks on


U.S. policy. Consequently, any successful U.S. strategy
must be holistic, i.e., embracing and utilizing all the
instruments of power—diplomacy, information,
military, and economic. It must, first, be coordinated
rigorously at home within the framework of clear
policy guidance as to just how important this region is
for America. The recommendations for policymakers
that are contained here also emphasize the need to
work with allies both within the area and outside it,
e.g., India, the European Union, and the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization. This means working with all the
regional governments to the extent that it is possible,
no matter how unsavory their conduct is or has been.
Only on the basis of this internal reorganization of our
own policy process that employs all policymaking
agencies in a coordinated fashion, as well as by ongoing
and simultaneous close monitoring of the possibility of
failed states here, and cooperation with allies will it be
possible for the United States to retrieve the situation
and reinvigorate its capacity for securing important
national security interests pertinent to Central Asia.
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U.S. INTERESTS IN CENTRAL ASIA
AND THE CHALLENGES TO THEM
Introduction.
Central Asia is an area whose importance to the
United States is acknowledged to be growing. In
2004 Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage told
Central Asians that “stability in the area is of paramount
1
importance and vital national interest.” Yet today
American interests are under attack from three sides in
Central Asia: Russia and China, the Taliban and their
supporters, and the authoritarian misrule of Central
Asian governments. Worse yet, it is not implausible
that some local governments might fail. As Director
of National Intelligence John Negroponte reported to
Congress,
Central Asia remains plagued by political stagnation and
repression, rampant corruption, widespread poverty,
and widening socio-economic inequalities, and other
problems that nurture radical sentiment and terrorism.
In the worst, but not implausible, case central authority
in one or more of these states could evaporate as rival
clans or regions vie for power—opening the door to an
expansion of terrorist and criminal activity on the model
of failed states like Somalia and, when it was under
2
Taliban rule, Afghanistan.

While some of these attacks are or would have been
unavoidable, others are due to shortcomings in U.S.
policy which gave these adversaries opportunities to
exploit those defects in U.S. policy to their own advantage. This monograph addresses these deficiencies and
includes recommendations for extricating America
from the present unhappy situation confronting it
there.


U.S. Interests in Central Asia.
U.S. interests in Central Asia primarily are strategic.
They derive first from the proximity of this area to
3
Russia, Iran, and China. Indeed,
The United States and the West in general find themselves
increasingly dependent on the continued stability
and development of the Central Eurasian region. The
United States is heavily invested in Afghanistan, and
its engagement there and in Central Asian states is a
long-term endeavor. The future of this region has a
considerable bearing on the development of the Global
War on Terrorism and in general on U.S. security
interests in Eurasia; the maintenance of access to airspace
and territory in the heart of Asia; the development of
alternative sources of energy; and the furthering of
4
freedom and democratic development.

Hence Russia and China view any U.S. presence in
Central Asia as a standing challenge, if not a threat,
to their vital interests which inherently are imperial
in nature and entail a diminution of the effective
sovereignty of Central Asian states. Therefore, it is not
surprising that the paramount U.S. objective under
both the Clinton and Bush administrations has been
to uphold the integrity, independence, sovereignty,
and security of these countries against Russian and
Chinese efforts to dominate them and circumscribe
their freedom.5 As stated in June 2004 by Assistant
Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and
Labor, Lorne Craner,
The primary strategic goal of the United States in
Central Asia is to see the development of independent,
democratic, and stable states, committed to the kind of
political and economic reform that is essential to modern
societies and on the path to integration and to the world
economy. The strategy that we follow is based on


simultaneous pursuit of three related goals. The first of
these goals is security. Our counterterrorism cooperation
bolsters the sovereignty and independence of these
states and provides them with the stability needed to
undertake the reforms that are in their long-term interest.
However, in order for these nations to be truly stable
over the long-term and to be fully integrated into the
international community, to achieve their potential, they
must allow for greater transparency, respect for human
rights, and movement toward democratic policy. Finally,
the development of Central Asia’s economic potential,
including its extensive natural resources, requires free
market economy reforms and foreign direct investment.
This is the only way to improve the well-being of the
region’s people, diversify world energy sources, and
facilitate the movement of these countries into the world
6
economy.

In other words, energy access, though important,
is not and should not be the primary driver of U.S.
policy here. Rather, it is a means to an end. Opening
up Central Asian states’ access to markets and energy
companies’ reciprocal access to them enables Central
Asian governments to diversify their customer base
and gain access to global markets where they can sell
their products at global market prices. In this sense,
the driving force behind U.S. policy is anti-monopoly,
while the driving force behind Moscow and Beijing’s
policies is quintessentially monopolistic in nature.7
This American policy of defending the independence,
integrity, and security of these states extends the longestablished vital geostrategic interest of the United
States in forestalling the rise of any Eurasian empire
in either continent that could challenge it. And there
should be little doubt that imperial success in Central
Asia would only encourage the rulers in Moscow and
Beijing to extend further their hegemonic aspirations.
Certainly they have long known that a great power


rivalry or competition for influence in Central Asia is
rising and regard any alternative method of building
organized structures of relationships there as a threat
8
to their vital interests.
Since September 11, 2001 (9/11), a second vital
interest for the United States has appeared, namely
defense of the United States and of Europe from Islamic
terrorism personified by Osama Bin Laden and carried
out by the Taliban and their allies. Consequently,
victory in Afghanistan, i.e., the conclusive routing of
the Taliban and the establishment of a secure, viable,
and legitimate Afghan state, is a vital interest which
must be achieved just as much as, if not more, than
in Iraq. The other important interests of the United
States apply, first, to what might be called an open
door or equal access for U.S. firms in regard to energy
exploration, refining, and marketing. To the extent that
sales of Central Asia’s states’ large energy holdings are
restricted to Russia due to the dearth of pipelines or
oil and gas, they will not be able to exercise effective
economic or foreign policy independence. Therefore
energy access on equal terms to American and other
Western firms relates very strongly to the larger
objective of safeguarding these states’ independence,
sovereignty, and prospects for secure development.
Not surprisingly, the leitmotif of U.S. energy policy
has been to foster the development of multiple pipelines
and multiple links to outside consumers and providers
of energy, including, more recently, electricity, with
9
regard to India. The Central Asian energy-producing
states recognize that their security and prosperity lie in
diversification of pipelines so U.S. and Central Asian
interests are in harmony in this area. Washington
has sought to prevent a Russian pipeline or overall
energy monopoly from forming in the oil market with


considerable success, while it has had much less success
with regard to natural gas. Simultaneously, America
has sought to isolate Iran from Central Asian energy
by urging states to build pipelines that bypass Iran and
enforcing sanctions upon those states and firms who
are trading with Iran.
Examples of pipelines bypassing Iran and Russia
are the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline where the
United States long has urged Kazakhstan to join it and
to participate in the construction of a pipeline under the
Caspian Sea; a projected Turkmenistan-AfghanistanPakistan (TAP) line, which may or may not be extended
to India, or alternatively a potential pipeline using
newly discovered sizable Afghan energy resources to
the Subcontinent; and the recent attempt to link Central
10
Asian and South Asian electricity networks. Indeed,
U.S. and Western firms have been relatively successful
in gaining access to Kazakhstan’s oil fields in terms of
11
contracts for exploration or refinery, and marketing.
Finally, Washington has a major interest in promoting
domestic policies in all these states—the five former
Soviet republics and Afghanistan—that will lead them
over time toward democratization, open markets,
open societies, good governance, and, eventually as
a result, to their lasting security against both internal
and external challengers.
Military-Political Challenges to U.S. Interests:
Russia and China.
Today all these interests are under attack, and the
U.S. policy in Central Asia is embattled and under
siege. Moscow and Beijing, as well as to a lesser degree
Tehran, view America’s political and strategic presence
in Central Asia with unfeigned alarm. Indeed, Russia


12

and China suspect America’s desire for bases there.
Despite Russo-Chinese protestations of support for
the U.S. war on terrorism, in fact they wish to exclude
America from the area and fear that it means to stay
there militarily, and in other ways, indefinitely. In this
campaign, Moscow has taken the lead, with Chinese
and Iranian support. Russia has sought with great
consistency and success to establish a gas cartel under
its leadership. Russian President Vladimir Putin started
calling for this in 2002 and has moved steadily since
then to achieve this goal, under the guise of an energy
club, which he reiterated at the most recent summit
13
of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
Russia may actually be in sight of this goal. As the U.S.
forecasting firm, stratfor.biz, reported in late 2005,
All natural gas produced in the former Soviet Union
comes from Gazprom, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, or
Turkmenistan with any natural gas originating in a
country ending in “stan” having to transit through
Kazakhstan and Russia on its way to any market. The
KazMunaiGaz deal means that Gazprom—and by
extension the Kremlin—now owns all of that gas. Any
state wishing to use Central Asian gas in order to get
energy independence from Russia is now out of luck.
[Obviously this also includes the Central Asian states
themselves-author.] This is particularly worrisome for
states such as Ukraine and the Baltic states who now have
no reasonable alternative to Russian-owned natural gas.
Russia has been bandying the threat of sharply higher
energy prices around for years. Now it has finally taken
the concrete step necessary to make that an arbitrary
14
reality.

Thus the degree to which Central Asian energy markets
are open or closed is an issue of great and increasing
importance to European states’ energy security and
explains why European interest in Central Asia, even if


it still is relatively small, is growing.15 This fact heightens
the already important and obvious consequences of
any such cartel. A Russian-led cartel, and worse yet
the possibility of a joint Irano-Russian cartel which
may be implicit in Putin’s latest proposal to the SCO
and in Iranian soundings about a gas and oil arc with
Russia, would prevent Central Asian states from selling
natural gas on the open market through diversified
pipelines and to the customers of their choice, thus
perpetuating their backwardness, dependence upon
16
Russia, and slowing their economic growth. Such a
cartel also would facilitate Russia’s ability to put the
squeeze on European customers for concrete economic,
political, and strategic gains at the expense of Western
interests like the factual independence of Ukraine, the
Baltic states, Georgia, and Central Asian governments.
Accordingly, Russia also has brought considerable
pressure to bear upon Kazakhstan, if not Turkmenistan
and Azerbaijan, to desist from supporting the BakuTbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline or the idea of constructing a
17
pipeline under the Caspian Sea. Either Kazakhstan or
Turkmenistan, if not both, might be forced to become
18
Russia’s “partners” in natural gas. Such policies
also lead, in both Russia and the local regimes, to
the consolidation of authoritarian governments that
rely on resource rents to keep themselves in power,
i.e., they are petro-states. Indeed, arguably the Putin
regime could not survive in its present structure if it
19
did not dominate Central Asian gas and oil sectors.
Therefore American success in opening up those
sectors has knock-on effects in Russia beyond the more
directly observable consequences of such liberalization
in Central Asia.
Russia also has waged a stubborn campaign to
prevent Central Asian states from affiliating either


with the U.S. or Western militaries. It seeks to gain
exclusive control of the entire Caspian Sea and be the
sole or supreme military power there, while states
like Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan rely upon Western,
and especially U.S., assistance to help them develop
forces to protect their coastlines, exploration rigs, and
territories from terrorism, proliferation operations, and
20
contraband of all sorts.
In addition, Russia has formed the Collective
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) to prevent local
states from aligning with the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) or getting too involved with its
Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. As part of this
drive, Moscow now demands a veto power over other
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) members’
defense ties to the West. Russian Defense Minister
Sergei Ivanov stated that,
The countries of the region are members of the Collective
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). And [if the
countries of the region are] making a decision about
hosting new bases on their territory, they should take
into account the interests of Russia and coordinate this
21
decision with our country.

Even in 2003, Ivanov claimed the right to intervene in
these countries and more recently highlighted Russia’s
anxiety about any potential political change in these
states’ internal constitutions. Undoubtedly, military
22
replies to such challenges are being considered.
Similarly, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov threatened
supposedly “disloyal” governments in the CIS with the
23
use of “every conceivable economic pressure tactic.”
Another purpose of the CSTO is to create legalpolitical grounds for permanently stationing Russian
forces and bases in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and possibly


Uzbekistan, ostensibly to defend these regimes against
24
terrorism. Nikolai Bordyuzha, the CSTO’s Secretary
General, also has called on its members to coordinate
efforts to counter religious extremism, i.e., give it a
license to meddle in their domestic affairs. And the
CSTO, under Russian leadership, constantly is seeking
to augment the scope of its missions in Central Asia,
moving from air defense to counterterrorism, and now
discussing peace support operations in order to cement
25
a Russian-dominated security equation there.
Observers understand that these policy imperatives
are part of a larger pattern of activities that points to
intensified Russian efforts to create more effective
trade and defense organizations in the CIS under
its auspices and consolidate its hegemonic position
there. Russia’s activities in regard to the Caspian
Sea play an important role in this project but have
received scant attention in the West. Since April 2005,
Russia repeatedly has advocated an international
naval task force or operations group in the Caspian
26
called CASFOR. Putin set up this task force or rapid
reaction force allegedly to defend against terrorism,
arms trafficking, drug running, and proliferation of
WMD components, and supposedly modeled it after
the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization’s
BLACKSEAFOR (Black Sea Force).
Even so, CASFOR is to be planned as a conventional
naval force that does not appear to be appropriate to
the missions Moscow proposes. This has led observers
to suspect that Russia intends to subsume the fledgling
naval forces of Central Asian states, set up to guard
their coastal installations within a Russian command
structure, and prevent them from obtaining Western
support for developing their own defense capabilities.
Moscow also hopes thereby to consolidate its


dominant position in the Caspian and in the continuing
discussions on the ultimate disposition of its waters
by agreement among the littoral states, making the
proposed CASFOR an intended instrument of Russian
hegemony in Central Asia. Also, Russia wants to
enhance its CIS organization, the CSTO, so that the
SCO, which it regards as largely a Chinese initiative,
does not have the sole prerogative of helping Central
Asian states to defend themselves.
Finally there are signs that Russian figures are
entertaining thoughts of a preemptive intervention
if they believe that it is needed to rescue potentially
failing states like Kyrgyzstan from collapse. According
to a recent assessment by Ilyas Sarsembaev,
Some Russian military analysts consider that if Kyrgyzstan
were overtaken by a complete political collapse, Russia
and Kazakhstan could impose some kind of protectorate
until stability could be reestablished and new elections
held. In this scenario, the United States would allow
Moscow to take action in Kyrgyzstan, because most of its
own resources would already be mobilized in Iraq and
Afghanistan—and probably in Iran and Syria. Russian
help would then be welcomed and much preferred to
that of China. Indeed, if Russia did not dare to put itself
forward as a stabilizing force, China might use Uyghur
separatism.27

No matter how fanciful this scenario might sound, it
illustrates both Russia’s determination and growing
capabilities in Central Asia and the way in which
domestic pathologies there could interact to create an
international crisis and conflict.
Sarsembaev’s example also confirms that, in reality,
these Russian forces in Central Asia are there to defend
Russian interests and/or keep the current authoritarian
regimes in power. Despite Russia’s relative military
10

weakness and unbroken military decline in 1991-2000,
it now has bases in 12 of the former Soviet republics,
and the expansion of its capability to project power
into these areas, if not beyond, by expanding existing
bases or building new ones is one of the leading drivers
28
of current Russian military policy. Similarly, another
motive force of Russian military policy is the effort to
develop, sustain, and project the land, sea (Caspian),
and air capabilities needed to prevent local governments
from either receiving U.S. weapons and assistance or
allowing U.S. military bases in their territories. For
example, this objective is one of the driving forces
29
behind Russia’s proposals for CASFOR. The practical
outcome of so exclusive a force made up only of
littoral states would be to confirm the littoral states
as dependencies of Russia, put Iran in a subordinate
position in the Caspian, and exclude foreign military
30
or energy presence there.
Simultaneously, Moscow and Beijing also have
waged an unrelenting campaign since 2002 to
impose limits on the duration and scope of America’s
presence on Central Asian bases and more generally
31
in the region. They succeeded in Uzbekistan, thanks
to Washington’s misconceived policies there. For
example, Washington failed to counter effectively
Russo-Chinese propaganda, at both the presidential
and public levels, that the United States was behind
the revolutions of 2003-04 in Georgia, Ukraine, and
Kyrygyzstan and also behind the Andizhan uprising of
2005.32 Moscow and Beijing also constantly are bringing
enormous pressure on Kyrgyzstan to force the United
States out of the base at Manas and submit to being
33
part of a Russian and Chinese sphere. Under domestic
and foreign pressure, President Kurmanbek Bakiyev
of Kyrgyzstan demanded a 100-fold increase in the
11

earlier rent for Manas of $2 million annually. Probably
only the combination of deep U.S. pockets, high-level
intervention by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice
and former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld,
and renewed fighting in Afghanistan has allowed
America to stay at Manas by providing $150 million
34
in assistance to Kyrgyzstan. The recent upsurge
of fighting in Afghanistan ironically worked to U.S.
advantage here, since Bakiyev openly and formally had
tied the extension of the base to the level of fighting in
35
Afghanistan.
Although former Secretary Rumsfeld also apparently sought to obtain increased access in Tajikistan, he was
rebuffed by that government, which is no less mindful
of its dependence upon Russia and its vulnerability to
36
Russian pressure. Russia also has sought to forestall
these states from buying Western equipment by selling
them Russian weapons at subsidized prices. And
in return for their debts, it has sought to restore the
Soviet defense industrial complex by buying equity
37
in strategic defense firms located there. Russia and
China also have engaged in training programs for
Central Asian military officers.
Most significantly, Moscow and Beijing have
utilized the SCO as a platform for a collective security
operation in Central Asia, sponsoring both bilateral
and multilateral Russian and Chinese exercises with
local regimes and with each other on an annual and
expanding basis since 2003. The SCO’s utility to
Moscow and Beijing does not end here. While significant
differences exist between Russia, China, and among
the other members and observers (India, Pakistan, Iran,
Mongolia) as to whether the SCO should be mainly a
promoter of trade and economic development, or a
military alliance, or another energy forum that Russia
12

would dominate, or a basis for regional cooperation
as Kazakhstan and the smaller states would prefer, it
clearly has been envisioned by Beijing and Moscow
since its inception as a forum for unifying Central Asian
governments in an anti-American regional security
38
organization. Moreover, Russia and China clearly
want it to be a regionally-exclusive organization of
growing stature so that Central Asian states will not
be members of any other similar organization, e.g.,
NATO, which could counter it.39 Indeed the SCO’s
charter declaration of June 15, 2001, (before the 9/11
attacks on America) was clearly an anti-American
policy document and reflected several months of SinoRussian diplomatic labor in Central Asia.40
The members also are divided as to whether
its membership should expand to include the new
41
observer states of Iran, Pakistan, India, and Mongolia.
Nevertheless, Beijing openly and consistently
proclaims the SCO to be a model for what it is trying
to do in regard to Asian security in Southeast Asia and
beyond, i.e., replace the U.S.-led alliance system in
Asia with one of its own creation that is attuned to its
interests rather than to U.S. and its allies’ stated values
and interests. As Joshua Cooper Ramo demonstrated
recently, China’s policies toward Central Asia,
particularly the development of the SCO, exemplify the
process by which China hopes to build a prosperous
neighborhood under its auspices and thus shelter its
exploding economic development from both internal
and foreign threats.
Step one for the SCO was to build the group, the first
multilateral group China had started on its own. Step
two: expand it to discussions of trade, economics
and energy. Step three: begin discussions on more
substantive security partnerships. The SCO has gone
so far as to conduct its own joint military maneuvers,
13

in China’s Xinjiang Autonomous Region. This approach
of deepening regional multi-level ties will likely be
repeated in other forums, such as ASEAN + 3 grouping
42
(ASEAN plus Japan, Korea, and China).

At the same time Russia sees it as an organization
whose international importance and standing are
43
growing. Therefore, the United States should take
this organization and its development seriously as a
template for China’s and Russia’s, if not Iran’s, broader
foreign policy objectives.
Finally Moscow and Beijing have waged substantive, comprehensive, and systematic efforts to undermine the American presence in Central Asia due to
U.S. support for democratic reform. These even include
rehearsal of counter-revolutionary military operations.
By doing so, they also consciously strive to foreclose
even the possibility of such reforms in Central Asia. Thus
they have become stalwart champions of the status quo
which includes massive corruption, repression, and the
promise of sweetheart deals, if not promises of support
44
for Central Asian rulers’ chosen heirs. Since Russia’s
failure in 2004 to insert its own candidate for President
of Ukraine and the ensuing Orange Revolution there,
Russia, China, and local governments have advanced
unceasingly and disseminated the idea that the United
States, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), or the
West in general were and are behind the so-called color
revolutions, and are attempting to overthrow local
governments and replace them with supposedly more
pro-American and thus anti-Russian or anti-Chinese
45
forces who have no domestic support. Russian
officials charge that such “pressure” which allegedly is
interference in their domestic politics is “heightening
46
tension” in the region.

14

As local dictators tend to believe that they are
irreplaceable and that all opposition is external and
terrorist in nature, this is an easy idea to sell. President
Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan publicly and
forcefully criticized this new American policy in his
address to the Kazakh parliament in February 2005,
3 months after his government stated that it was not
changing its foreign policy. Indeed, in his State of the
Union speech of February 18, 2005, he explicitly said,
Today we are witnessing superpower rivalry for
economic dominance in our region. We have to address
correctly this global and geoeconomics challenge. We
have a choice between remaining the supplier of raw
materials to the global markets and wait [ing] patiently
for the emergence of the next imperial master or to
pursue genuine economic integration of the Central
47
Asian region. I choose the latter.

It is easy to sell this idea especially when it is backed
by a relentless state-run media campaign from Moscow,
Beijing, and the local regime, and when there is no
effective or coherent response, as has been the case with
U.S. policy. Although the United States had spent $43.7
million in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Azerbaijan as of
August 2005 to support independent press operations,
48
it is clear that this effort is too little, too late. Indeed,
it fairly may be said that Washington apparently
still does not have any effective or discernible public
information policy in Central Asia to advance its case
and neither did it even take the idea of rebutting these
charges seriously.49 Consequently, the United States
is paying the price for its complacency and neglect.
Thus U.S. policies in regard to security, energy access,
and democratization are under attack in Central Asia
from the local dictators, Russia, China, and to a lesser
degree, Iran.
15

The Afghan Threat.
Adding to the difficulties is that America faces a
resurgent Taliban backed up with enormous drug
revenues, Pakistani support, and an inconsistent
international effort to rebuild Afghanistan, while its
government remains weak and unsure of itself. Indeed,
on July 21, 2006, General David Richards, the most
senior British commander in Afghanistan, described
the situation there as being “close to anarchy” thanks
to the conflicts between private and foreign funding
agencies, corrupt local officials, and the lack of control
over forces moving back and forth over the border
with Pakistan. He also described NATO forces as being
short of equipment and “running out of time to meet
50
the expectations of the Afghan people.” Similarly
General James Jones (USMC), then Supreme Allied
Commander Europe (SACEUR), stated that, in fact,
“We’re not making progress; we’re losing ground”
in cracking down on narcotics cartels that help fund
Taliban insurgents as well as al-Qai’da in Afghanistan.
He also stated that the answer there is not primarily a
military one.51 Even if the dispatch of NATO forces into
the South temporarily may have stemmed the Taliban
offensive as has been recently argued, unless the
underlying nonmilitary causes of their resurgence are
addressed and overcome, we will be back in the same
situation there in 2007.52 Indeed, NATO commanders
admit that they were surprised by the strength of
this Taliban resurgence and that military forces alone
cannot win this war.53 Moreover, the United States
cannot relieve its forces in Afghanistan and withdraw
them to other duties at least until March 2007.54
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The Deteriorating U.S. Position.
As a result of these attacks against the U.S. position
in Central Asia, America has lost the base at Karshi
Khanabad, faces constant pressure in Kyrgyzstan—
where its hold on Manas remains precarious—and
elsewhere, and it and its NATO allies are fighting a
revived and strengthened Taliban under conditions
that are in many ways less favorable than in 2001.
Worse yet, a situation where only Russia and possibly
China can engage Uzbekistan decisively during a crisis,
while Washington is wholly excluded from doing
so, is a strategic loss for America. Indeed, Professor
Alexander Cooley of Barnard College wrote that “This
eviction represented the worst of all possible outcomes
for the United States. The United States did not receive
credit for standing on political principle and voluntarily
leaving K2, nor did it manage to secure operational use
55
of the base.”
Uzbekistan evidently listens only to Moscow and
Beijing, and America certainly is not Kazakhstan’s
56
priority partner even under the best of circumstances.
Therefore, the State Department’s hope of relying upon
Kazakhstan as potentially America’s strongest partner
in Central Asia and as a potential leader for advancing
the goals we wish to see there is fundamentally
unsound and cannot serve as a basis for a successful
57
U.S. policy in the future. Certainly one cannot truly
call Kazakhstan “a corridor for reform” as Secretary
Rice has done, while its domestic developments incline
58
in the opposite direction. Although Kazakhstan has
made numerous proposals for regional cooperation
among the local governments and occasionally has
stood up to Russia by selling gas to Georgia and joining
the BTC pipeline, its calls for regional integration have
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gone nowhere, and the limits upon it for independent
action are quite clear because its primary orientation,
59
as a series of recent deals reconfirms, remains Russia.
Indeed, as one Russian news report observed, “not
once in the years of independence has Astana’s policy
60
gone counter to Moscow’s interests.”
While Kazakhstan will continue to work with
Washington on pipeline issues, to obtain equipment and
training for its self-defense in and around the Caspian,
take part in the PfP, and accept foreign investment,
nobody should expect it to be a leader in Central Asia on
Washington’s behalf against Moscow and Beijing and
forego the balanced policy its government rigorously
follows.61
Neither should the U.S. Government ignore
opportunities for comprehensive engagement with all
the other states. Indeed, doing so would be a serious
mistake. As Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and
Eurasia Daniel Fried has said, America “cannot and
will not have a one-dimensional relationship with any
country in the region based solely on security concerns
62
or economic interests.” Similarly, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense James MacDougall has observed
that, “You cannot allow your security interests to
prevent the agenda of political development, and you
cannot prevent your agenda of political development
from stopping your interests in the security and energy
63
fields. These have to go hand in hand.” Any U.S.
Central Asian policy must take advantage of every
opportunity to interact productively with all of the
local governments.
Conclusions.
To regain its footing in Central Asia, the United
States must first understand where it has gone astray.
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U.S. mistakes consist, first of all, in shortcomings
in its own policy processes and equally, if not more
importantly, in its policies as seen in and from Central
Asia. The administration cannot recover the American
position in Central Asia without addressing both sets
of issues quickly and decisively. First of all, the policy
process, including the interagency process, with regard
to Central Asia and many other issues, e.g., Korea and
Russia, and security cooperation in general, is broken.64
Indeed, some analysts and observers believe that there
is no such thing as a regular policy process, and that
this has happened because the administration prefers it
65
that way. Often the Pentagon was sought to arrogate
ever more control of foreign policy under its auspices
and take a hard line in so doing or else administration
officials are divided against each other with no
66
clear line being able to emerge. Or alternatively,
the State Department invokes democratization
and democracy as absolutes and elevates values to
interests, e.g., that the main agenda item in regard to
Central Asia is democracy, not security interests, thus
blocking consideration of other alternatives. Indeed
democratization trumps the latter in its view.67
For example, in advance of an October 2005 trip
to the region by Secretary Rice, Assistant Secretary
Fried proclaimed that, “U.S. interests in advancing
political and economic reform in the region will not be
68
subordinated to security concerns.” Thus the Pentagon
emphasizes U.S. strategic interests in the region, while
the State Department emphasizes democracy as its
main priority and invokes President Bush’s statements
69
on the subject dating back to his second inaugural.
Under conditions of the war in Afghanistan and
on terrorism beginning in late 2001, American security
interests naturally prevailed in U.S. policy towards
19

the region and in its assistance packages. Central
Asian leaders realized soon enough that this situation
translated into a freer hand for them as long as they
gave the right verbal assurances about ameliorating
the internal conditions in their own countries that give
rise to unrest. Once Western funders, including the
U.S. Government, grasped this reality, their sources of
funding for institutitonal and other reforms began to
dry up under pressure of domestic declines in spending
on democracy promotion and heightened regional
repression. Thus the Bush administration’s rhetoric on
democracy was belied by the fact that it steadily spent
less and less money on democratization projects in
2003-05, and the funds involved were relatively small
to begin with. And since there was no real penalty for
Central Asian leaders who disregarded the imperatives
of reform at home for their own security, by 2005 U.S.
policy in the area had neither carrots nor sticks with
which to secure its overall objectives. Consequently,
that policy and its instruments, like the base at Karshi
Khanabad, were vulnerable to any reversal of fortune
that came our way.70
In the wake of the loss of the base at Karshi Khanabad,
it is not altogether clear if we have assimilated the
lesson of our earlier failed policies and refined our
objectives into a coherent strategy for attaining them.
Assistant Secretary Fried’s remarks, cited above, show
that the values of democracy and human rights now
take precedence over national interests relating to
defense and security, particularly as regards the war on
terrorism. Fried further announced that U.S. security
and democratization interests were indivisible. While
this kind of rhetoric makes its authors and audiences
feel good, it certainly cannot constitute a foreign policy
or effective diplomacy. For example, it does not explain
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how we will reconcile these two strands of policy when
faced with a tangible choice between them. Thus, it
cannot serve as the basis for a coherent policy. We
saw this in the U.S. Government’s uncoordinated and
ultimately ineffectual response to the crisis generated
by the Andijan massacre in 2005 that led to our ouster
71
from Karshi Khanabad.
Nevertheless, these sentiments accurately reflect
Secretary Rice’s remarks that “the greatest threats to
our security are defined more by the dynamics within
weak and failing states than by the borders between
72
strong and aggressive ones.” Furthermore,
Our experience of this new world leads us to conclude
that the fundamental character of regimes matters more
today than the international distribution of power.
Insisting otherwise is imprudent and impractical.
The goal of our statecraft is to help create a world of
democratic, well-governed states that can meet the needs
of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in
the international system. Attempting to draw neat, clean
lines between our security interests and our democratic
ideals does not reflect the reality of today’s world.
Supporting the growth of democratic institutions in all
nations is not some moralistic flight of fancy; it is the
73
only realistic response to our present challenge.

Thus we have laid down a marker to Central Asian
and presumably all CIS governments. At the same
time, such statements, no matter how strong, can
only alarm local governments further concerning our
predictability and their stability. They also ultimately
lead to a situation where U.S. Government officials
either make futile protests to deaf governmental
officials or else they end up trying to dictate to CIS
governments how they should democratize so that the
74
“right results” come out.
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One of the dangers of such policies is that it leads
us into either too great an immersion in the domestic
politics of targeted countries or to the charge of a
double standard since it is impossible to pursue this
policy practically with all countries in the world with
equal intensity. And, indeed, we are not doing so on a
global basis with equal intensity; so, in any case, such
a policy is impossible physically as well as morally and
strategically dubious.
Therefore, while such statements make powerful
rhetoric, in Central Asia, according to expert observers,
75
they are empty and irrelevant to the realities there.
Moreover, they contribute to the undermining of U.S.
strategic and security objectives because they feed the
belief that those promoting democracy are working for
an elitist foreign concept that is alien to local realities
and traditions and that seeks to undermine either local
or central authorities. Allegedly, according to this
view, the purpose of the campaign for democratization
is to unseat reigning rulers and, since Central Asian
authorities believe that the only real opposition is Islamic
terrorists, America’s position fuels their belief that it
76
neither understands the region nor their interests. If
democratization is America’s first priority there, then
it has given the region over to Russia and China, for
both Washington and Moscow have convinced local
leaders that their aforementioned beliefs about U.S.
policy are correct, whatever the real truth might be. As
the Hudson Institute’s Zeyno Baran remarked about
Vice President Cheney’s May 2006 trip to Kazakhstan
and praise for the authoritarian regime there,
If the United States continues to balk at dealing with
leaders of energy-producing countries because of
democracy concerns, then soon there won’t be any more
democracies in the region to participate with. You can
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say all you want about how we will not take part in these
great games, but Russia and China are taking part in
them, and the United States risks losing out.77

Obviously a Russian- or Chinese-dominated Central
Asia is hardly compatible with any progress towards
democratization.
Second, this contradiction within the U.S. Government’s policy process implies to local elites that
America also is not truly serious about democracy.
Moreover, and third, since the United States has cut
back steadily on economic assistance to Central Asia,
including Afghanistan, it also has stimulated the belief
that it does not understand the area, or that it will not
stay the course, and that Central Asia means less to it
78
than the previous rhetoric would otherwise imply.
Fourth, America’s and Europe’s refusal until quite
recently to address the issue of Afghanistan’s drugs
has led to an explosion of the scourge of narcotics
across Central Asia and reinforced the belief of
American and Western inattention to local states’ true
79
security interests and needs. Fifth, the U.S. failure to
devise a viable information policy that is tailored to
this region’s mores, cultures, and special needs, has
reinforced all those previous negative feelings, while
also leaving the Russians and Chinese to operate with
total freedom in support of regressive rulers or corrupt
dictators. Sixth, the United States has failed to foresee
what might happen in states that are so misgoverned
that violence is likely, either through economic distress,
or through a succession crisis. Thus its reactions have
been uncoordinated and haphazard with resulting
negative consequences for U.S. policy that are visible
to all. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are likely to be
failed states when the present rulers leave the scene,
and in Uzbekistan we have already seen, as has the
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Uzbek government, that it is vulnerable to both violent
80
incitement and to outbreaks of public violence.
America lost its position in Uzbekistan, not because
it championed human rights but because Washington
neglected to take it seriously, address its real
problems, or answer its queries as to what our plans
were regarding the base at Karshi Khanabad; pay off
Islam Karimov, its President, and the other members
of his government and family as it did in Kyrgyzstan;
and because of the accumulated outcomes that are
traceable to the aforementioned defects of our policy
81
process. Indeed, Washington refused to give answers
to Uzbekistan’s persistent queries that began in 2002 as
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to its ultimate objectives regarding the base there. In
2004 Assistant Secretary Craner testified that,
Central Asia has a major strategic importance for the
United States and Uzbekistan inevitably plays a key role
in our policy toward the region. It occupies, as we know,
a core position in Central Asia. It has, by far, the largest
population, and it is the guardian of a centuries long
tradition of enlightened Islamic scholarship and culture.
And it boasts the largest and most effective military
83
among the five countries.

Yet today, due to those policy failures, Washington
has little or no dialogue with this state, and formerly
pro-American politicians like former Defense Minister
Golunov are disgraced publicly because of their ties to
the United States. These trends take place even though
the recent successful removal of nuclear materials from
Uzbekistan shows that such dialogue can be sustained
84
if the issue is sufficiently vital.
Seventh, NATO’s continuing divisiveness and
dilatoriness about sending troops to Afghanistan and
giving them sufficiently robust rules of engagement
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has slowed American and allied ability to counter the
Taliban resurgence, especially as America has reduced
85
the number of troops there. Since NATO is trying to
stabilize the country with only about half the number
of troops that Moscow sent there in 1979-89 in its
abortive effort to Sovietize Afghanistan, it appears that
more troops might be needed. So the current level of
NATO commitment probably will not suffice even on
a purely military level, let alone the political and statebuilding level. Eighth, America has failed to press the
international community sufficiently strongly to make
good its pledges to Afghanistan which are still lacking,
without which reconstruction there will be greatly
86
prolonged, if it is even successful.
Finally, and ninth, in regard to Afghanistan, there is
the unsolved problem of Pakistan. It is almost axiomatic
that Afghanistan cannot be pacified if the border with
Pakistan is unpoliced, and insurgents have free rein to
come and go as they please. Yet, unfortunately, this is
precisely what is happening. Since 9/11, Pakistan has
been forced to accept formally the fall of the Taliban.
Nevertheless, considerable evidence suggests that
it is assisting the Taliban to regroup in and around
the Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas.87 Moreover,
it recently has signed a peace agreement with the
tribes in Waziristan and other regions that border
Afghanistan, suggesting its inability or unwillingness
(if not both) to deal firmly with the terrorist enclaves
there. As one assessment of this accord observes, it
probably formalizes a situation of continuing crossborder destabilization from Pakistan to Afghanistan.
As part of this agreement, the Pakistani military will
cease its unpopular military campaign in the semiautonomous North Waziristan region. In exchange,
the local Taliban militants will halt their attacks on
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Pakistani forces and stop crossing into nearby eastern
Afghanistan to attack Western and Afghan forces
hunting Al-Qaeda and Taliban militants. For Pakistan,
this was an acceptance of the ground reality that its
military would never be able to defeat tribal militants
in a region where Pakistan’s writ has never extended.
For the critics, however, the deal amounts to giving an
effective amnesty to the insurgents, allowing them even
more freedom to cross into Afghanistan and pursue
their militant agenda. While Pakistani officials claim
that foreign militants can stay in the region only if they
obey Pakistan’s laws and stay away from militancy,
it is unclear how this can be enforced in a region that
has become even more out of bounds for the Pakistani
government after this agreement.88

Recommendations.
A successful policy must learn from these mistakes
and surmount them. Therefore the administration must
undertake the following steps. First, it must repair the
broken policy process. The administration must decide
what Central Asia’s real importance is to the United
States and assign sufficient material and political
resources to back up that investment. Toward this
end, the President and his cabinet must impose policy
discipline on the players after arriving at a consensus
among themselves on these issues. They must establish
clear and coordinated interdepartmental priorities for
the U.S. emplacement in Central Asia and then proceed
to implement them. Given the existing situation
throughout the region, the security and independence
of these states must come first for otherwise no
democratization is remotely conceivable. But this
does not mean neglecting democratization as an issue.
Rather, America must engage both governments and
civil society or opposition groups who are not terrorists.
It must engage governments with the argument that
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they have signed international conventions upholding
these practices and that the United States is not trying
to supplant them, but rather ensure that their countries
become both more secure and prosperous. Since their
interest is at stake in a violent overturn, this argument
may have some resonance. But it must be backed up by
increased assistance and concrete economic and other
policies that address their needs.
In this connection, it is essential to continue and
upgrade the series of high-level visits by cabinet
members and even Vice President Cheney, and
reinforce those with visits by lower ranking officials
on a regular basis to monitor policy implementation.
It also might be useful to set up a governmental
commission like the Gore-Chernomyrdin commission
on Russia or subsequent commissions of this sort to
ensure regular progress by both sides in a mutuallyconsultative process that addresses common needs and
projects. Likewise, it is very important to come up with
alternatives for regional association to Russo-Chinese
projects. Therefore, reports of an expanded Pentagonsponsored collaboration to combat the drug trade are
to be welcomed, not just because Russian analysts fear
they signify an anti-SCO ploy, but also because they
show America means business with regard to Central
89
Asian states’ true security threats. Given their not
unfounded belief that America had ignored the drug
problem that was becoming the most serious threat to
their internal security because of its many ramifications,
positive joint action against that scourge is decidedly
welcome.
Similarly, in this context of overall concern for
Central Asian security, it is imperative that America
find ways to reestablish a viable policy dialogue with
Uzbekistan, even if it only begins at a low level. As noted
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above, U.S. policy cannot omit any local government
that wishes to cooperate with it on a mutually beneficial
90
basis. U.S. Central Asian policy, to be successful, must
not only be multidimensional, it must be all-inclusive,
i.e., it must include even Uzbekistan. If this cooperation
and/or dialogue are built on a solid foundation, even
at a low level, then they can enable American officials
to talk to that regime on issues of shared concern and
rebuild mutual confidence. Clearly, while President
Islam Karimov has thrown his lot with the Russians
and Chinese for now, he fully understands the nature
of whom he is dealing with in Beijing and Moscow.
Even though he may wrongly feel he was betrayed by
America, he probably cannot afford to become a total
satellite of Moscow. Neither can America or its allies
afford to let Uzbekistan fall into that trap, especially
as it might turn again to violence at the first sign of
Karimov’s weakness or succession.
Second, having decided upon its priorities and
having begun to implement them, the United States
also must address NATO, the European Union (EU),
and India, its new strategic partner in this area. They
must devise an agenda or agendas of common activities
oriented to achieving the objectives that they all share
and then work to fulfill those agendas whether it be
in the five former Soviet republics or Afghanistan.
This applies as much to the integration of energy and
electricity links either to Europe or to India and Pakistan,
as it does to sustaining the comprehensive recovery of
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Afghanistan and victory over the Taliban.
Third, it is essential that the U.S. Government
quickly develop and put into practice a viable public
information program using all the media at its
disposal for Central Asia. This program must address
the cultural framework of the region and present the
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truth about American and other policies. Washington
also must endeavor to retain and even open up every
outlet available, like Radio Free Europe and Radio
Liberty, to get the word out about events affecting this
area. Under no circumstances can it concede either to
Moscow or Beijing, or to local dictators, a monopoly
over the means of information.
Fourth, the administration must devise rewards
and punishments for those who would use the SCO as
a means to eject us from Central Asia. This also means
upgraded bilateral relations with local governments
to strengthen them against Russo-Chinese pressures.
While America obviously has a wide-ranging agenda
with Moscow and Beijing, it should not give away its
interests in Central Asia or those of Central Asian states
in return for progress on other issues with Rusisa and
China. For example, Washington and Moscow are about
to negotiate on allowing Moscow to become a center
for storing spent nuclear fuel and or for distributing it
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to states who wish to use it peacefully. While this can
prove helpful with regard to Iran or even North Korea,
behind it also lies Moscow’s program to centralize
all the CIS republics’ nuclear energy operations
under its control and thus dominate the entire field
of energy in Central Asia and deprive those states of
any independent access to use the energy buried in
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their own territories. Therefore Washington must be
careful with the way it approaches those two larger
states. And as a general rule, it must engage the states
around Russia or China as much as it does Russia and
China in order to prevent a successful neo-imperial
policy in Central Asia, or elsewhere for that matter.
Fifth, the United States must continue to offer
these states—Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan in
particular—the resources with which to defend their
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sovereignty and territory independently of Moscow
and Beijing if they so choose. Washington cannot allow
Russia, China, and Iran to turn the Caspian Sea and
Central Asia into a closed sea for their own exclusive
benefit. Nor can it allow the Russian-sponsored CSTO
to achieve recognition by NATO as the only legitimate
organization providing for Central Asian defense that it
so ardently craves, or for the SCO to be the only game in
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town when it comes to the provision of security. This
is because for NATO, according to Russian officials,
Central Asia is “a zone of interests,” whereas for Russia
95
it is a zone of “responsibility.” This support for their
military development becomes particularly critical if
the United States will, as General John Abizaid (USA),
Commander of U.S. Central Command, announced,
reduce its presence in Central Asia but enhance
96
military cooperation with local countries. These
programs entail expanded cooperation between all the
relevant U.S. military services and Central Asian and
Transcaucasian governments.
This can be done in numerous ways. One is to
expand bilateral programs involving all the services
with their opposite numbers in receptive Central Asian
(and Transcaucasian) states. A second alternative is
expanded reliance on NATO as a means of improving
the quality and training of Central Asian militaries.
NATO is now directing operations in Afghanistan.
Moreover, it is also a priority security organization
of choice for most post-Soviet states. Even Armenia
is upgrading its military ties to the West and NATO
significantly.97 The new states seek to be identified
as Western, and recognize that adherence to the
PfP program provides meaningful enhancement of
their security through affiliation, if not membership,
in a nonpredatory multilateral and cooperative
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security arrangement.98 Furthermore, NATO is the
only effective organization that provides a standard
of measurable activity and security against such
contemporary threats as terrorism, and proliferation.99
NATO also has demonstrated its ability to provide
security for Afghanistan’s elections and to work on
behalf of a broader security stabilization than simply a
conventional peace support operation.
Expansion of international ties between Central
Asian militaries and Western forces also could mean
starting discussions to upgrade India’s participation
in the modernization and westernization of Central
Asian forces. Those forces also could be introduced
to the bilateral Indo-American exercises now being
conducted among all the services so as to build strong
trilateral working relationships based on experience
and trust. The same applies to educational exchanges
and expert dialogues. Certainly New Delhi and
Washington share many critical interests in Central
Asia such as prevention of terrorism and stabilization
of Afghanistan. These fora would be ways to reinforce
activities towards those ends and towards the larger
end of helping to stabilize the Central Asian region as a
whole. Admittedly, probably any program undertaken
with India would anger Pakistan, especially if it
embraced the new Afghan army. However, the initial
scale of such activities could remain relatively small,
be confined to the five former Soviet republics and
take place under a primarily bilateral Indo-Central
Asian umbrella. If the program is successful, then it
could expand to bring Pakistan in as a confidencebuilding measure. In time, Pakistan’s participation
could help further integrate its military with Western
democratic notions of conduct and provide a lasting
institutional mechanism by which to influence it. Such
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fora also could stimulate a regional dialogue with
India and the Central Asian militaries or governments
that would be mutually beneficial to all parties. It
should be pointed out that all these aforementioned
possibilities for increasing our partners’ participation
in these programs in the former Soviet Union require
intergovernmental agreements and intense detailed
participation in these activities and exercises by all the
services of those countries and the United States. Thus
the U.S. Army, Navy (where appropriate) and Air
Force all have roles to play in making such programs
work.
Sixth, as stated above, U.S. economic activity must
go beyond ensuring equal energy access to helping these
states move forward on their overall independence,
and economic and political development by supporting
diversification of energy connections; helping them
build pipelines to the seas and oceans, and allowing
them to bring all their products more easily to Asian
and European markets. But that policy also must
include trade, investment, and financial instruments,
and not be restricted to energy. This also includes
supporting projects that would upgrade and integrate
Central Asia’s infrastructure so that economic ties
among states and peoples can flourish more rapidly
than would otherwise be the case. Only the United
States is uniquely situated to do this, given its strong
economic position and ties to international economic
institutions, a trump card in its hand relative to both
Moscow and Beijing, let alone Iran. Consequently such
efforts must be intensified.
Seventh, while doing all this, the administration
also must be upgrading our government’s capability
to act promptly in case of unforeseen contingencies.
The State Department’s Office of Reconstruction and
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Stabilization, under Ambassador John E. Herbst,
must be directed, if it is not doing so already, to begin
planning for contingencies having to do with the real
possibility of state failure in Central Asia, particularly
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. If and when that occurs,
it will usher in violent responses to that condition of
state failure. Such chaos cannot be allowed to proceed
in uncontrolled fashion or to abdicate U.S. real interests
in the region. Adequate forecasting and rapid response
policies, not only military ones either, must be thought
through and implemented so that the United States
is ready to move at a moment’s notice, if necessary,
and provide whatever assistance is needed to ensure
stability. U.S. assistance to forestall state failure does
not have to be military in nature. But it does need to
be timely and well-focused. This is because it is clear,
as noted above, that rival states like Russia already are
discussing publicly potential intervention scenarios to
forestall a Central Asian state’s failure.100
With regard to Afghanistan, America should
undertake the following actions to maximize its chances
for both victory and reconstruction under an enduring
and legitimate government that is moving, however
slowly, towards democratization. First, more pressure
on Pakistan is needed to reduce, if not terminate,
its support for the Taliban and other terrorists. The
administration already has brought considerable
pressure to bear upon the Pakistani government, but it
and NATO cannot slacken their grip. If America’s good
offices are requested and acceptable to both sides, the
administration also should use them with regard to the
glacial but ongoing negotiations on Kashmir between
India and Pakistan. Second, the United States should
continue to promote India’s overall ability to interact
economically with Central Asia and Afghanistan, seek
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pipelines and electricity outlets, as it is now doing
not only to strengthen the individual economies and
polities of the region, but also to build a foundation
for greater and more enduring regional economic
integration through infrastructural links that open up
these areas to greater development. And it also should
encourage the continuation of Indian support for the
Karzai regime in Afghanistan.
Fourth, Washington needs to keep pushing NATO
members to maintain, and if necessary expand, their
commitment to Afghanistan and to provide their
forces with sufficiently robust rules of engagement to
get the job done on the ground. Fifth, while doing so,
the administration also must pressure the international
community to fulfill their pledges to the revival of
Afghanistan and to join America in doing so in a
way that strengthens the Afghan population’s own
capability to rule itself without external interference or
tutelage. This also means a substantial offensive against
the drug lords and the drug problem which is now
the main financial pillar for the Taliban, if not other
terrorist groups. Success in this particular campaign
requires a comprehensive approach to the problem
and can only be undertaken if there is sufficiently
strong political will among all the players in and out
of Afghanistan. And throughout this process, pressure
must be kept on Pakistan to encourage it to terminate
its policies of sheltering and supporting the Taliban
and the terrorists who seek to operate in South Asia.
As long as they have a safe haven, they will continue
to destabilize both South and Central Asia, thereby
negating America’s best efforts in both regions.
While none of these recommendations for Central
Asia and Afghanistan represents a panacea, especially
if undertaken in ad hoc, individual, or incomplete
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fashion, taken together they can provide a foundation
from which the administration can move to repair its
past policy shortcomings and retrieve at least some, if
not all, of its past position here. If Central Asia is as
important as former Deputy Secretary of State Armitage
said it was, the administration must be prepared to
demonstrate that importance in both word and deed
and do so through a coordinated multidimensional
strategy. This kind of strategy brings to bear all the
instruments of policy, not just the military instrument,
and does so in ways that leverage the superior ability
of the United States and its allies to work for peace,
security, liberty, and prosperity. Although this is going
to be the work of years, if not decades and generations,
it is incumbent upon Washington to begin now because
if it does not seize this day and those that follow, the
crises that could engulf this region will more likely
than not do so soon. Thus the crisis will come more
quickly and more violently than would otherwise have
been the case. Then even all of the best efforts of the
United States may not prove to be enough to avert
those crises.
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